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Problem area 
Resilience in air traffic 
management (ATM) means the 
intrinsic ability of the ATM 
system to adjust its functioning 
prior to, during, or following 
changes and disturbances, so 
that it can sustain required 
operations under both expected 
and unexpected conditions. It is 
well realized that human 
operators have key contributions 
to resilience of operations. 
There are various resilience 
analysis approaches that 
describe the work-as-done of 
human operators along various 
viewpoints, typically by textual 
descriptions. The objective of 
this paper is to present an 
effective and structured 
qualitative approach for the 
resilience analysis of large sets 
of disturbances and strategies 
for work-as-done at the sharp 
end of a complex sociotechnical 
system. This is pursued by 
studying the roles of air traffic 
controllers and airline pilots in 
achieving resilience in current-
day air traffic operations. Air 
traffic controllers and airline 
pilots are key operators working 
at the sharp end of air traffic 
operations. In their work they 
have to deal with a large variety 
of potential disturbances and in 
their strategies they need to 
balance the effects on a range of 
key performance areas (KPAs), 
e.g. safety, capacity, 
environment and costs. We 
consider quite generically that a 
disturbance in ATM somehow 
perturbs air traffic operations 
and thereby may affect the 
performance in one or several of 
its KPAs.  
 
Description of work 
The starting point of the study 
was a list of disturbances that 
were identified during hazard 
brainstorm sessions. We used 
interview sessions and a 
workshop with pilots and 
controllers to gather data about 
strategies for dealing with 
disturbances. A set of 459 
disturbances were clustered at 
three abstraction levels and 
characterised with respect to 
frequency of occurrence. 
Strategies of pilots and 
controllers for dealing with 
these disturbances were 
identified, and these strategies 
were clustered at three 
hierarchical levels. The 
strategies were analysed with 
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respect to key characteristics, 
such as detection and 
interpretation of the 
disturbances, coordination 
about the strategy, and strategy 
acquirement. The effects of the 
strategies on the KPAs safety, 
capacity, environment and cost-
efficiency were characterised 
and ranked. 
 
Results and conclusions 
This paper developed 
approaches for systematic 
structuring of large sets of 
disturbances and strategies for 
analysis of resilience of a 
complex sociotechnical system. 
This structuring was achieved by 
hierarchical clustering of 
disturbances and strategies in 
ATM, by systematic 
characterization of key aspects 
of the strategies, by 
classification of effects on KPAs, 
and by combining these effects 
and disturbances frequency 
classes. We found that the 
majority of the disturbances in 
ATM are quite common and that 
the human roles in detection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and interpretation of the 
disturbances, as well as in 
coordination to achieve a 
suitable strategy are important. 
Assessment of the implications 
of the strategies on ATM KPAs 
showed that most strategies 
have positive safety effects, 
which may come at the expense 
of negative effects on other 
KPAs for a variety of 
disturbances. These results 
emphasize the important roles 
of pilots and controllers for 
dealing resiliently with 
disturbances in ATM and 
balancing the implications on 
the operational performance of 
their actions. Design principles 
for future more automatized 
ATM should take well into 
account these important human 
roles. 
 
Applicability 
The approach used in this paper 
can be applied to systematic 
structuring of large sets of 
disturbances and strategies for 
analysis of resilience in complex 
sociotechnical systems, such as 
ATM. 
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SUMMARY 
The objective of this paper is to show how qualitative resilience analysis 
approaches can be effectively structured for large sets of disturbances and 
strategies for work-as-done at the sharp end of a complex sociotechnical system. 
This is pursued by studying the roles of air traffic controllers and airline pilots in 
dealing with a wide set of disturbances in current air traffic operations. 
Disturbances are events or conditions that may affect one or more components 
or processes of the ATM system and thereby perturb air traffic operations. A set 
of 459 disturbances are clustered at three abstraction levels and characterised 
with respect to frequency of occurrence. Strategies of pilots and controllers for 
dealing with these disturbances are identified, and these strategies are also 
clustered at three hierarchical levels. The strategies are analysed with respect to 
key characteristics, such as detection and interpretation of the disturbances, 
coordination about the strategy, and strategy acquirement. The effects of the 
strategies on the key performance areas (KPAs) safety, capacity, environment and 
cost-efficiency are characterised and ranked. The results show that the strategies 
for dealing with disturbances have positive safety implications for the majority of 
disturbances and negligible safety effects for the remaining cases. The effects on 
the other KPAs are negligible in the majority of cases, but they are negative for a 
variety of disturbances. The results emphasize the important roles of pilots and 
controllers for dealing resiliently with disturbances in ATM. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of resilience has gained considerable interest for the design and 
analysis of sociotechnical systems. As outlined in reviews of (Folke, 2006; 
Francis, 2013), the origins of the resilience perspective stem from ecological 
studies on the dynamics and interactions of prey and predator populations, 
including a core paper of Holling (Holling, 1973). In the early 1990s the 
resilience perspective for the analysis of ecosystems revived and was also 
extended to socio-ecological systems. In (Folke, 2006; Walker et al., 2004), 
resilience is defined as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and to re-
organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same 
function, structure, identity and feedback. In general, a disturbance is an event 
that is (potentially) detrimental to one or more components or processes within a 
system (Francis, 2013). What constitutes a disturbance depends on the system 
context, e.g. in ecological systems a disturbance typically refers to something 
that leads to loss of biomass, such as a forest fire, hurricane, or a new predator. 
The analysis of resilience of sociotechnical systems has been stimulated 
considerably by safety-related research of Hollnagel and co-workers and their 
introduction of the resilience engineering research field (Hollnagel et al., 2006; 
Nemeth et al., 2009). This has led to the identification of Safety-II, i.e. a way of 
understanding safety beyond the traditional way (Safety-I). Hollnagel et al. (2013) 
make clear that the focus of Safety-II is on everyday actions and outcomes, rather 
than the restricted view on (rare) accidents and incidents in Safety-I. As such, 
Safety-II can be understood as studying safety via a work-as-done viewpoint in 
resilience engineering. 
 
Various views exist on key aspects of resilient systems and ways to assess 
resilience. According to Hollnagel (2009) the four essential cornerstones for a 
resilient system are the abilities to respond to the actual, to monitor the critical, 
to anticipate the potential, and to learn from the factual. Following an extensive 
review of resilience in a variety of fields, Francis and Bekera (2014) conclude that 
absorptive, adaptive and restorative capacities are at the core of a resilient 
system, indicating capacities to absorb system perturbations, to adjust to 
undesirable situations by undergoing change, and to return to an acceptable 
level of operations, respectively. For the assessment of resilience in air traffic 
management (ATM), Woltjer et al. (2013) use the following principles: work-as-
done (understanding the way work is done, including operator performance 
variability, rather than the work-as-imagined); varying conditions (considering 
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expected and unexpected conditions that may be encountered); signals and cues 
(considering the information for anticipation, monitoring, and response by 
operators to varying conditions); goals trade-offs (understanding the trade-off 
operators make between various goals); adaptive capacity (considering the 
capacity to adjust to foreseen and unforeseen varying conditions); coupling and 
interactions (considering the complexity and distributed nature of the ATM 
sociotechnical system); timing, pacing, and synchronization (understanding the 
dynamics of the ATM sociotechnical system); under-specification and 
approximate adjustments (considering the incompleteness of procedures and the 
adjustments operators have to make in their work-as-done). These principles 
were applied in a workshop format for analysis of resilience of a future ATM 
operation. Furniss et al. (2011) developed a resilience markers framework for 
reasoning about resilience in small teams, which studies behaviour in a hierarchy 
of three levels of abstraction (from high to low): a markers level describing the 
high-level principle, a strategy level expanding on details of the marker level, and 
an observation level describing the detailed work-as-done in a particular context. 
The strategy level is structured by four elements: a resilient repertoire, 
encompassing the skills and competencies to respond to threats and 
vulnerabilities outside the design-base; a mode of operation, describing the style, 
structure or organisational mode in an operational context; resources and 
enabling conditions, describing the hard and soft constraints that influence 
whether a strategy can be enacted; and vulnerabilities and opportunities, 
describing events and conditions that, respectively, may reduce or improve 
system performance. The resilience markers framework was applied in a case 
study for analysis of control room crews of a nuclear power plant using a re-
analysis of previously recorded simulator experiments. Rankin et al. (2014) 
developed a strategy framework for analysis of resilience in everyday operations. 
It uses the following categories for structuring work situations: strategies, 
describing mechanisms used to cope with variations; objectives of strategies; 
forces and situational conditions, describing the context in which strategies are 
carried out; resources and enabling conditions, describing necessary conditions 
for successful strategies; resilience abilities, referring to the four cornerstones of 
(Hollnagel, 2009); sharp-end and blunt-end interactions, describing how a 
strategy has impact on different parts of a distributed system. In addition to 
these strategy categories, Rankin et al. (2014) developed a variety space 
diagram, which relates the frequency of a disturbance, the availability of 
responses to cope with a disturbance, and the level of sharp- and blunt-end 
interactions in a strategy. The approach has been applied using results of group 
discussions between safety practitioners on safety-critical situations in various 
domains (e.g. health care, nuclear power, air traffic control). In summary, these 
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resilience analysis approaches all describe work-as-done using various viewpoints 
along strategy categories and principles. The results are mostly textual 
descriptions of work-as-done along these viewpoints. In the applications such 
results were derived for selected operations by workshops or analysis of 
simulator experiments. 
 
The objective of this paper is to present an effective and structured qualitative 
approach for the resilience analysis of large sets of disturbances and strategies 
for work-as-done at the sharp end of a complex sociotechnical system. This will 
be pursued by studying the roles of air traffic controllers and airline pilots in 
achieving resilience in current-day air traffic operations. Air traffic controllers and 
airline pilots are key operators working at the sharp end of air traffic operations. 
In their work they have to deal with a large variety of potential disturbances and 
in their strategies they need to balance the effects on a range of key performance 
areas (KPAs), e.g. safety, capacity, environment and costs. We consider quite 
generically that a disturbance in ATM somehow perturbs air traffic operations 
and thereby may affect the performance in one or several of its KPAs. Examples 
of disturbances in ATM are bad weather, system malfunctioning, airspace 
closure, and misunderstandings. In the context of ATM, resilience has been 
defined similarly to (Folke, 2006; Walker et al., 2004) as the intrinsic ability of a 
system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and 
disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions (Eurocontrol, 2009). The resilience engineering 
perspective stresses the flexibility and system oversight of pilots and air traffic 
controllers as being essential for efficient and safe operations in normal and 
uncommon conditions (Eurocontrol, 2009; Eurocontrol / FAA AP15 Safety, 2010). 
As a way towards the main objective, we have the following sub-objectives: 
• To identify and hierarchically structure disturbances in air traffic operations 
and assess their frequency of occurrence; 
• To identify strategies (work-as-done) by pilots and controllers for dealing with 
disturbances; 
• To hierarchically structure strategies of pilots and controllers; 
• To analyse the strategies w.r.t. detection, coordination and strategy 
acquirement in the organisation; 
• To evaluate the effects of disturbances on the ATM KPAs safety, capacity, 
environment, and cost-efficiency; 
• To derive statistics for the analysis results;   
• It is expected that the approaches developed in this paper for ATM can also 
be used to study resilience in other complex sociotechnical systems with 
large numbers of potential disturbances.   
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the main sources used 
as input for the analysis. Section 3 presents the identification of disturbances in 
ATM, the clustering of these disturbances and an assessment of their frequency. 
Section 4 presents the identification, clustering and characterization of strategies 
for dealing with the disturbances. Section 5 presents an assessment of the 
effects of the strategies on KPAs in ATM. Section 6 presents a discussion of this 
research. 
 
Parts of this research were presented in a conference paper (Stroeve et al., 
2013a). 
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2 MAIN SOURCES FOR THE ANALYSIS 
As input for the analysis we have used three main sources: a list of disturbances 
(Section 2.1), interviews with pilots and controllers (Section 2.2), and a workshop 
with pilots and controllers (Section 2.3). 
2.1 LIST OF DISTURBANCES 
There exist a broad variety of events, conditions and circumstances that may 
disturb air traffic operations. As a starting point for the analysis in this paper we 
use a list of disturbances that was presented in (Stroeve et al., 2011). The basis 
for this list are disturbances that were identified during hazard brainstorm 
sessions with pilots, controllers and other experts, as part of a large number of 
ATM safety assessment studies. Key objectives of these brainstorm sessions were 
to identify as many as possible events, conditions and circumstances that may 
potentially have a negative effect on safety, and to refrain from any criticism 
and/or analysis during the brainstorm (De Jong, 2004). As result of these ‘pure 
brainstorming’ sessions, a wide variety of events, conditions and circumstances 
that may occur during ATM operations were identified, which were not analysed 
or restricted to situations that affect safety only. Therefore, such brainstorming 
sessions resulted in a wide variety of disturbances that may perturb ATM 
operations and thereby possibly influence various ATM key performance areas, 
including safety, capacity, environment and cost-efficiency. For example, an 
identified disturbance is ‘group of passengers arriving late at the gate’, and the 
resulting delay may lead to more stress on the pilots from a safety perspective, 
and to an increase in costs due to accumulated delays from a cost perspective. In 
an earlier study (Stroeve et al., 2011), a database of more than 4,000 
disturbances identified in the hazard brainstorm sessions was processed in order 
to remove similar disturbances and to de-identify them for specific air traffic 
operation contexts. This led to a set of 525 disturbances, which is input for the 
current study. 
2.2 INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS 
Interviews were conducted with air traffic controllers and airline pilots in order to 
find out how these operators detect and deal with disturbances that may occur in 
current air traffic operations. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain 
feedback about the way that the disturbances may be coped with in the 
operators’ normal work, building on their operational knowledge and experience. 
In preparation of the interviews, a selection of 98 disturbances was made, and 
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for each of these disturbances questions were formulated with respect to ways 
that operators may detect and deal with the disturbances.  
 
Interviews were conducted with five air traffic controllers (all active) and two 
pilots (one active and one recently retired). The expertise of the controllers 
includes positions at area, approach and tower control; both pilots were airline 
pilots. One of the controllers was also a supervisor, another had experience as an 
aircraft technician, and a third controller had experience as a general aviation 
pilot. The interviewees originated from four different European countries. In 
preparation of the interviews, the interviewees were sent the questionnaire 
forms, such that they could get an initial overview of the issues that would be 
addressed. They were not asked to complete the questionnaires in advance of 
the interviews. The interviews were conducted either face-to-face (3 interviews) or 
by telephone (4 interviews), and each lasted about three hours. The interviews 
were structured according to the questionnaire forms. In the interviews the pilots 
and controllers were asked to consider the way that the disturbances may be 
coped with in their normal work, building on their operational knowledge and 
experience. Some of the disturbances and the related questions were skipped 
during the interviews, because they were not considered relevant given the 
interviewee background, because the issue raised had already been discussed 
previously, or because of time restrictions. After each interview, minutes were 
provided and were sent to the interviewee for verification. The results of the 
interviews are reported in (Stroeve et al., 2011). 
2.3 WORKSHOP WITH PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS 
A two-day workshop was organized, involving eight air traffic controllers, two 
airline pilots, and one avionics technician. One of the controllers was also a 
supervisor. These controllers and pilots were different from the pilots and 
controllers that contributed to the interview sessions explained in Section 2.2. 
During the workshop 58 clusters of disturbances, including a total of 225 
disturbances, were presented by a moderator and projected on a screen for 
everybody to see. The participants were asked for their opinion about the 
frequency of occurrence of the disturbance, to explain how they would detect the 
occurrence of the disturbance, and to explain their strategy to deal with the 
disturbance. The responses were typed on screen for all to follow. After the 
workshop, minutes of the meeting, describing all answers, were distributed and 
verified by the participants. 
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3 DISTURBANCES IN ATM OPERATIONS 
Section 3.1 presents the selection of disturbances used in this study, Section 3.2 
presents the clustering of disturbances, and Section 3.3 describes frequencies of 
these disturbances in air traffic operations. 
3.1 SET OF DISTURBANCES 
The disturbances used in this study are a part of the list of 525 disturbances 
introduced in Section 2.1. In particular, a number of 66 disturbances are out of 
the scope of the current study, since they refer to future operations and/or 
future technical systems, or to security issues. As such, 459 disturbances remain 
as basis for this study. To clarify the broadness of the set of disturbances, some 
examples are presented next. 
 
Examples of disturbances related to technical systems are (1) Degradation of the 
brake system of an aircraft; (2) Trajectory disappears from flight management 
system (FMS); (3) Radar is not working; (4) Flight plans of air traffic control (ATC) 
system and FMS differ; (5) Different coding of curves by different suppliers of 
flight management systems; (6) Blind spots in radar coverage. It can be 
recognized that these examples reflect different types of technical system 
disturbances. The first three are temporary and typically sudden failure 
conditions. The fourth example is an inconsistency between air and ground 
systems, which is typically temporary for (part of) a flight. The last two examples 
reflect disturbances that are typically enduring and which may be considered as 
part of normal operations. 
 
Examples of disturbances related to human operators are (1) Pilots report wrong 
position; (2) Pilot mixes up different types of ATC clearances; (3) Controller 
corrects wrong aircraft; (4) Controller switches wrong stopbar off; (5) Pilot is 
fatigued; (6) Complacency of a controller. The first four disturbances may be 
considered as erroneous events. Fatigue and complacency in the last two 
examples are conditions that may be enduring for longer times. 
 
Examples of disturbances related to communication and coordination are (1) 
Failure in frequency changes between subsequent air traffic controllers; (2) Pilot 
reads back erroneously; (3) Controller and pilot communicate in a foreign 
language rather than English; (4) Lack of suitable radio telephony (R/T) 
phraseology. The first two disturbances may be considered as erroneous events. 
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The third disturbance may be considered as temporary event, but also as a part 
of a cultural attitude. The fourth disturbance is an enduring condition, which may 
become manifest in particular situations. 
 
Examples of disturbances related to traffic relations are (1) Speed differences 
between aircraft in a sequence; (2) Emergency flight; (3) Unidentified flying 
objects, e.g. weather balloons, leisure balloons, paragliders. The first disturbance 
is a typically occurring situation, which may be considered as normal variation in 
traffic streams. The latter two disturbances are sudden events.  
 
Examples of disturbances related to weather are (1) Reduced visibility; (2) 
Runway is slippery due to rain, snow, icing; (3) Wind influences expected time of 
arrival. These disturbances typically are temporarily occurring conditions. 
 
The above examples indicate that a wide variety of disturbances has been 
identified. The disturbances may be related to various components in the ATM 
socio-technical system (human operators, technical systems, procedures) and to 
interactions between the components. The disturbances include ATM external 
influences, such as weather and other flying objects. The disturbances may be 
sudden and temporary events, or they may reflect enduring normal variations in 
the operations. 
3.2 CLUSTERING OF DISTURBANCES 
As a starting point for the analysis of the human role to resilience in ATM, the 
disturbances were clustered. In this way the set of disturbances was structured 
and the number of individual disturbances that needs to be evaluated was 
reduced. The clustering process describes the disturbances at three hierarchical 
levels of abstraction and it forms subsets of disturbances on these levels: 
• Low-level: detailed description of a disturbance, being the description in the 
set of disturbances; 
• Mid-level: an aggregation of a number of related low-level disturbances; 
• High-level: a generic principle of a group of mid-level types of disturbances. 
 
Disturbances were clustered with regard to similarity of the source of the 
disturbance, such as disturbances due to particular technical systems, 
disturbances resulting from particular human operators, or disturbances arising 
in particular processes. For example, high-level disturbance clusters include 
‘Aircraft/navigation technical systems’, ‘Controller pilot communication’, 
‘Controller working context’, ‘Pilot performance’, and ‘Weather’. The high-level 
cluster ‘Aircraft/navigation technical systems’ contains mid-level disturbance 
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clusters such as ‘Accuracy of FMS routing’ and ‘Instrument landing system’, and 
the latter cluster includes specific low-level disturbances, such as ‘Wrong 
localizer frequency of the instrument landing system’, ‘Technical ILS failure’ and 
‘Failure to capture or track the precision approach lateral or vertical guidance’. 
 
A summary of the results of the clustering is provided in Table 1; details of the 
three-level clustering of disturbances are reported in (Stroeve et al., 2013b). The 
459 disturbances have been clustered into 18 high-level disturbance categories 
and in 149 mid-level disturbance categories. The mid-level disturbance 
categories contain 1 to 16 low-level disturbances. In about half of the 
disturbances (229 out of 459), pilots or air traffic controllers somehow may 
contribute to the existence of the disturbance, e.g. misconceptions of human 
operators, or errors in task performance.  
 
Table 1. Clustering of disturbances at three hierarchical levels. The grey boxes contain 
the high-level disturbance clusters, the left column presents all mid-level disturbance 
clusters, the right column present examples of the low-level disturbances and it provides 
the total number of low-level disturbances in a high-level cluster 
Mid-level disturbance clusters Low-level disturbances Size Examples 
Aircraft/navigation technical systems 
Accuracy of FMS routing ; Aircraft equipment 
level ; Cockpit display ; Conflict resolution 
advisory system ; Error in FMS routing ; 
False/nuisance alert ; Fuselage ; Generic 
airborne system ; Instrument landing system ; 
Landing system ; Positioning system ; 
Powerplant 
36 
• False alert of an airborne system 
• Trajectory disappears from FMS 
• Degradation of landing gear 
• GPS signal is disturbed at low altitudes 
• Degradation of engines 
Airport infrastructure & operations 
Aircraft ground movement ; Airport 
configuration ; Airport design ; Approach / 
runway lights ; Approach and landing ; Bird 
strike ; Fire brigade ; Maintenance work / 
obstacle ; No ATC ; Runway blocked or 
contaminated ; Vehicle movement 
30 
• Runway closed 
• Small aircraft parking places 
• Animals on the runway 
• High object close to runway (building, 
crane) 
Airspace 
Airspace availability ; Airspace design ; 
Change in airspace availability 6 
• Restricted airspace 
• Closure of airspace (e.g. due to 
emergency, volcanic eruption) 
ATC coordination 
Conflict / emergency ; Coordination military 
operations ; Coordination overload ; Different 
procedures / algorithms at ATC centres ; Error 
/ delay ; Language & cultural differences at 
ATC centres ; Planning & tactical ; Shift 
change ; Traffic handover ; Traffic level 
28 
• Military aircraft not VHF equipped 
• Miscommunication between controllers 
• Different cultures at coordinating ATC 
centres 
• Confusion about who has control 
• Traffic overload at sector boundary 
ATC System 
Aircraft identification ; Alert not properly 
provided ; ATIS ; False/nuisance alert ; Flight 57 
• Mislabelled identity 
• Display does not show alert 
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Mid-level disturbance clusters Low-level disturbances Size Examples 
plan ; General system outage ; Human 
machine interface ; Non-adaptable system 
mode ; Radar ; Strips ; Surveillance data 
distortion & delays ; System controller 
interaction ; Track problem ; Transponder 
problem 
• Controller display is cluttered 
• Blind spots in radar coverage 
• Track swap 
Controller performance 
Allowance to deviate from normal procedure ; 
Erroneous data entry ; Improper system use ; 
Mode selection ; Monitoring ; No checking ; 
Professional attitude ; System not effectively 
used ; Wrong / late decision ; Wrong or 
missing message 
23 
• Controller switches wrong stopbar off 
• Controller does not use alert system 
• Controller makes error in typing a 
message 
• Controller misuses equipment 
Controller pilot communication 
Aircraft identity ; Communication system ; No 
suitable phraseology ; Non-standard / poor 
R/T ; R/T misunderstanding ; R/T overload ; 
VHF frequency selection 
35 
• Controller mixes up company names 
• Lack of suitable R/T phraseology 
• VHF R/T frequency is blocked 
Controller situation awareness 
Aircraft capability ; Aircraft identity ; Aircraft 
intent ; Aircraft mode ; Aircraft state ; Airspace 
separation mode ; Alert interpretation ; 
Contradictory information ; Detection & 
interpretation of traffic situation ; Infrastructure 
& system functionality ; Reading error ; 
System trust 
40 
• Controller misidentifies an aircraft 
• Controller does not know airspace 
configuration 
• Controller ignores an alert (no 
evaluation) 
• A controller not aware of work in 
progress 
Controller working context 
Aircraft identity ; Automation ; Controller 
incapacitation ; Distraction ; Evacuation ; 
False failure report ; Organisation & workforce 
; Training & experience ; Workload 
27 
• Controller is fatigued and sleepy 
• Evacuation of ATC centre (e.g. fire 
alarm) 
• Strikes 
Delay 
Delay 3 • Missing passenger, aircraft has to wait 
or return to the gate 
Flight performance 
Aircraft performance limitation ; Extreme 
movements ; Fuel shortage ; Uncommanded 
movements ; Wrong direction 
8 
• Aircraft flies near its envelope extremes 
• Fuel shortage 
Maintenance 
No proper repair ; No regular check 5 • Technicians cannot fix a failure quickly 
Pilot performance 
ATC instruction/clearance ; Cockpit crew 
coordination ; Data entry ; Deviation from 
normal procedures ; Late reaction ; Monitoring 
; Position & intent reporting ; Wake vortex 
reaction ; Wrong / uncertain decision 
43 
• Pilots do not follow controller instruction 
• Checklist procedures not yet finished 
• Pilots report wrong position 
• Pilot validates without actually checking 
Pilot situation awareness 
Alert interpretation ; Controller situation ; 
Crew difference ; Detection & interpretation of 
traffic situation ; Event detection ; Routing ; 
Rules and procedures ; Runway choice ; 
System degradation ; System mode ; System 
32 
• Alert causes attention tunnelling 
• Pilot confuses radar heading with a flight 
level 
• Aircrew unaware of loss of voice 
communication 
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Mid-level disturbance clusters Low-level disturbances Size Examples 
trust 
Pilot working context 
Cultural differences ; Distraction ; Interaction 
with technical system ; Pilot incapacitation ; 
Safety culture ; Training ; Workload / 
information load 
18 
• Pilot performance is affected due to 
alcohol, drugs or medication 
• Pilot insufficiently trained for new 
concept 
Rules and procedures 
Changes in procedures ; Differences between 
procedures ; No suitable procedure available ; 
Procedure not tested ; Procedure restricts 
operational flexibility ; Unclear / difficult 
procedures ; Wrong procedure design 
19 
• Change in ATC procedures leads to 
confusion by pilots 
• Contingency procedures have not been 
tested 
• Wrong design of procedure 
Traffic relations 
Aircraft speed differences ; Complex 
operations ; Conflict propagation ; 
Emergencies ; Other flying objects ; Traffic 
density ; Traffic mix ; Wake vortex separation 
24 
• Speed differences between aircraft in a 
sequence 
• Resolution of conflict leads to other 
conflict(s) 
Weather 
Darkness ; Icing of wings ; Lightning ; Low 
visibility ; Pilot performance ; Technical 
systems ; Turbulence ; Weather info ; Wind ; 
Winter conditions at airport 
25 
• Sudden strong descent of cloud base 
• Weather forecast wrong 
• Strong variation in wind 
Total number of low-level disturbances 459  
 
3.3 FREQUENCIES OF DISTURBANCES 
As a basis for the analysis of effects of disturbances in ATM, an assessment was 
done of the frequency of their occurrence. Table 2 shows the four frequency 
classes used in this assessment, which are based upon the probability of 
occurrence of a disturbance per flight for commercial fixed-wing aviation in 
Europe. For an airport with 300,000 flights per year, these probability levels 
roughly imply: Very Rare – Fewer than 3 times per 10 years; Rare – Between 3 
times per 10 years and 30 times per year; Occasional – Between 30 times per 
year and 4 times per day; and Regular – More than 4 times per day. For 
prolonged disturbances the number of affected flights is leading. For instance, if 
there are snow conditions 10 days per year and these conditions have impact on 
3% of the yearly flights, then this disturbance is considered to be Regular, since 
the probability per flight is more than 0.01. 
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Table 2. Definition of frequency classes for probability of occurrence of disturbances per 
flight for commercial fixed-wing aviation in Europe 
Frequency class Probability per flight 
Very rare Less than 10-6 
Rare Between 10-6 and 10-4 
Occasional Between 10-4 and 10-2 
Regular More than 10-2 
Using these categories, we assessed frequencies of occurrence for each of the 
mid-level disturbances of Table 1. Sources used for this frequency assessment 
were expert opinions expressed during the workshop and interviews, and results 
in the literature. One or multiple frequency categories were selected for each 
mid-level disturbance. Multiple frequency categories were chosen for cases where 
the underlying low-level disturbances apply to different frequency categories. It is 
noted that the frequency assessment is quite rough, since specific contextual 
factors, which may have a considerable influence on the frequency of the 
disturbance, have not been taken into account in this assessment.  
An overview of the distributions of the frequency classes is shown in Figure 1. 
The results show that the whole pallet of frequency categories is applied to 
characterise the disturbances, ranging from very rare disturbances, e.g. general 
system outages or evacuation of ATC centres, rare disturbances, e.g. pilots using 
a wrong runway, occasional disturbances, e.g. changes in ATC procedures 
leading to confusion by pilots, and regular disturbances, e.g. workload problems, 
aircraft speed differences and poor weather conditions. A total of 109 mid-level 
disturbances have a single frequency category, whereas the remaining 40 mid-
level disturbances have at least two frequency categories associated. The 
majority of the identified mid-level disturbances occur more often than once 
every 10,000 flights. Thus the set includes many disturbances that are quite 
common, as well as a range of rarer disturbances. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2015-204 
May 2015 13 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Use of frequency categories for the mid-level disturbances. ‘Single’ denotes 
cases where the frequency category is applied uniquely. ‘Multiple’ denotes cases where 
the frequency category is part of a range 
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4 STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH 
DISTURBANCES 
Given a disturbance in an air traffic operation, pilots and controllers often have a 
choice of strategies that they can apply. Section 4.1 describes the identification 
of such strategies, Section 4.2 describes the clustering of these strategies, and 
Section 4.3 provides an overview of characteristics of the strategies. 
4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIES 
By using results of the workshop, the interviews, and the literature, we identified 
pilot and controller strategies for dealing with the disturbances. For each of the 
149 mid-level disturbances, the pilot and controller strategies for dealing with 
them were detailed in (Stroeve et al., 2013b). Additionally, for each mid-level 
disturbance one or a few key strategy elements were identified, which summarize 
the main aspects of the strategies.  
 
In this way, for air traffic controllers, a total of 97 key strategy elements were 
identified, e.g. ‘Extra control of flights of particular airlines’, ‘Ask pilot to report 
condition’, ‘Close runway’, and ‘Update weather information’. For airline pilots, a 
total of 71 key strategy elements were identified, e.g. ‘Report system failure’, 
‘Inform ATC about inconsistency’, ‘De-icing of the wings’, and ‘Follow procedures 
for system failures’.  
4.2 CLUSTERING OF STRATEGIES 
To promote a structured analysis of the pilot and controller strategies, the 
strategies were first clustered. Similar to the clustering of disturbances in Section 
3.2 and similar to the resilience markers framework for studying resilience of 
small teams by (Furniss et al., 2011), the clustering uses three hierarchical levels 
of abstraction: 
• Low-level: detailed description of a strategy, which is an identified key 
strategy element; 
• Mid-level: an aggregation of a number of related low-level strategies; 
• High-level: a generic principle of a group of mid-level strategies. 
 
Table 3 shows an overview of the clustering of controller strategies, as well as 
the numbers of mid-level disturbances to which these strategies are applied. The 
controller strategies are clustered into 7 high-level strategies, 27 mid-level 
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strategies, and 97 low-level strategies. As an example, the high-level strategy 
‘Adapt to context’ includes three mid-level strategy clusters ‘Adapt to differences 
between airlines’, ‘Improvisation’, and ‘Workload management’, and the first 
mid-level strategy cluster includes the low-level strategies ‘Adapt to cultural 
differences’, ‘Effectively deal with differences between airlines’, ‘Extra control of 
flights of particular airlines’, and ‘Speak slowly in R/T with particular airlines’. 
Table 3 shows that the high-level strategy clusters ‘Tactical control cycle’ and 
‘ATC-pilot interaction’ have the highest numbers of low-level strategies. These 
clusters include many strategies that are at the core of the daily operations, such 
as instructing and informing pilots, and monitoring and planning traffic.  
 
Table 3. Strategies of air traffic controllers for dealing with disturbances. The grey boxes 
contain the high-level strategy clusters, the left column presents all mid-level strategy 
clusters, the right column presents examples of low-level strategies and it provides the 
total number of low-level strategies in each high-level cluster 
Mid-level strategy clusters Low-level strategies 
 Size Examples 
Adapt to context 
Adapt to differences between airlines ; 
Improvisation ; Workload management 10 
• Extra control of flights of particular 
airlines 
• Use necessary R/T only 
ANSP organisational task 
Inform pilots ; Management ; Reporting 
problems to organisation ; Safety 
management ; Training and experience 
13 
• Report inappropriate procedure 
• Inform technicians 
• Additional training 
ATC-pilot interaction 
Coordinate with pilots ; Provide information to 
pilots ; Provide instructions to pilots ; Request 
information from pilots 
24 
• Explain traffic context 
• Inform pilots on routes and procedures 
• Adapt instruction following feedback 
from pilots 
• Split up clearance 
• Ask pilot to report condition 
Configuration management 
Manage airport configuration ; Manage 
airspace configuration ; React to 
environmental condition 
11 
• Close runway 
• Split sectors 
• Use low visibility procedures 
Coordination & information provision 
Coordination with controller ; Coordination with 
others ; Provide information 12 
• Coordinate with other controllers 
• Coordinate with airline 
• Update weather information 
React to non-nominal situations 
Apply contingency procedures ; Follow 
emergency procedures 8 
• Apply contingency procedures 
• Use alternative system 
• Inform fire brigade 
Tactical control cycle 
Apply separation criteria ; Error correction ; 
Evaluation of information ; Monitoring of traffic 
; Planning of traffic ; Pro-active control ; 
Tactical solution 
19 
• Correct mistake 
• Continuous evaluation of information 
from various sources 
• Extra monitoring of aircraft 
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Mid-level strategy clusters Low-level strategies 
 Size Examples 
• Give priority to flight 
• Use margins for variance in 
performance between aircraft 
Total number of low-level strategies 97  
 
Table 4 provides an overview of the strategies used by airline pilots. These are 
clustered into 7 high-level strategies, 25 mid-level strategies, and 71 low-level 
strategies. The high-level strategy clusters with most elements at the lowest level 
are ‘React to non-nominal situation’, ‘ATC-pilot interaction’, and ‘Flight control’. 
These clusters include strategies for normal daily operations as well as strategies 
for rarer non-nominal situations.  
 
Table 4. Strategies of airline pilots for dealing with disturbances. The grey boxes contain 
the high-level strategy clusters, the left column presents all mid-level strategy clusters, 
the right column presents examples of the low-level strategies and it provides the total 
number of low-level strategies in each high-level cluster 
Mid-level strategy clusters Low-level strategies Size Examples 
Adapt to context 
Improvisation ; Workload management 4 • Deal in a flexible and professional way with the situation lacking proper procedures 
Airline organisational task 
Management ; Reporting problems to 
organisation ; Safety management ; 
Training and experience 
12 
• Schedule effectively coordinating crews 
• Report system failure 
• Fatigue risk management programme 
ATC-pilot interaction 
Coordination with ATC ; Follow ATC 
instructions ; Provide instructions to ATC ; 
Request information from ATC 16 
• Ask for priority 
• Inform ATC about inconsistency 
• Ask controller for clarification on 
procedures 
Coordination & information provision 
Crew resource management ; Provide 
information to others ; Request information 
from others 
3 
• Inform passengers about extreme 
movements 
• Ask other aircraft for the correct frequency 
Flight control 
Deal with (potential) conflicts ; Evaluation of 
information ; Flight planning ; Follow 
operating procedures ; Make corrections ; 
Pro-active control 
14 
• See and avoid 
• Avoid extreme movements 
• Check fuel 
React to environment 
Adapt operation ; Use applicable 
procedures 6 
• Avoid cumulonimbus clouds 
• De-icing of the wings 
React to non-nominal situation 
Adapt operation ; Follow (upset) recovery 
procedures ; Follow emergency procedures 
; Use fall-back solution 
16 
• Reduce weight and return 
• Follow procedures for system failures 
• Use alternative system 
Total number of low-level strategies 71  
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4.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIES 
Key aspects of strategies for dealing with disturbances in operations include 
understanding who or what may detect the disturbance first; what kinds of 
interactions are used for achieving a common ground (Klein et al., 2005), i.e. a 
common understanding by the involved human operators about the disturbance 
and its potential effect on the operation; what kinds of interactions are used for 
coordinating about selection of the most appropriate strategy; and how has the 
strategy been acquired. We characterised the strategies for dealing with mid-level 
disturbances by classifying disturbance detection, establishing common ground, 
strategy coordination, and strategy acquirement by the following elements. 
 
First detection of disturbance – Which human operator or which technical system 
may detect the disturbance first? One or several of the following may apply: 
• Controller – A controller may detect the disturbance first.  
• Pilot – A pilot may detect the disturbance first. 
• System notification/alert – A system notification or alert may be the origin of 
the detection of the disturbance. 
• Other – Another origin of the first detection, e.g. an airport operator, a cabin 
crew member, a meteorologist, etc. 
 
Establish common ground – Which kinds of interactions are used to achieve a 
common understanding of the disturbance and its effect on the operation?  
Strategy coordination – Which kinds of interactions are used in achieving a 
strategy to deal with the disturbance? 
Both establishing common ground and strategy coordination are characterised by 
selecting one or several of the following interaction classes: 
• No – No actions to achieve common ground / coordinate about a strategy. 
• Local-Ground – Common ground / coordination between air traffic controllers 
(including executive and planning controllers, and supervisor) at a local 
control facility (tower, control room).  
• Global-Ground – Common / coordination ground between air traffic 
controllers at different control facilities. 
• Local-Air – Common ground / coordination of the cockpit crew (and possibly 
also the cabin crew). 
• Global-Air – Common ground / coordination of the cockpit crew during flight 
with others in the airline organisation, e.g. Airline Operations Centre. 
• Ground-Air – Common ground / coordination between air traffic controller 
and cockpit crew. 
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• Org-Ground – Common ground / coordination at the level of the ANSP 
organisation, e.g. Safety Manager, operational concept developers, 
technicians, … 
• Org-Air – Common ground / coordination at the level of the Airline 
organisation, e.g. Safety Manager, Airline Operations Centre, … 
• Other – Common ground / coordination with e.g. maintenance, meteo, 
airport personnel, fire brigade, … 
 
Strategy acquirement controller – In what way has the strategy been acquired by 
a controller?  
Strategy acquirement pilot – In what way has the strategy been acquired by a 
pilot?  
One or several of the following classes may apply:  
• Training – The strategy has been acquired via training (basic / recurrent / 
special).  
• Experience – The strategy has been acquired via practical experience. 
• Creativity – The strategy is based upon creativity. 
• n.a. (not applicable) – Strategy acquirement is not applicable for controller or 
pilot.  
 
Figure 2 shows an overview of the statistics for the assessed characteristics of 
the strategies for dealing with the disturbances. Detailed results are available in 
(Stroeve et al., 2013b).   
 
It follows from Figure 2a that most often, controller and pilots can detect a 
disturbance first. To a considerably smaller extent, the disturbances can be 
detected first by a system, e.g. via an alert function, or by another means than 
controller/pilot/system. As follows from the sum largely exceeding 100%, there 
are many disturbances that can be detected first by multiple entities, depending 
on the specific circumstances.  
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Figure 2. Characteristics of strategies for dealing with disturbances in ATM 
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Following the detection of a disturbance, there can always be some kind of 
communication or coordination between involved actors as a way to achieve a 
common understanding of the disturbance and its effect on the operation 
(‘Establish common ground’). Figure 2b shows that such common ground is 
established to a large extent by interaction between pilot and controller, by 
interaction between controllers at a local facility, and by interaction of the 
aircraft crew. To a lesser extent a common ground is achieved by interaction 
between controllers at different control facilities, by interaction at the ANSP 
organisation, by interaction with others in the airline during flight, by interaction 
within the airline at an organisational level, or by other types of interactions.  
 
In line with the results for establishing common ground about the disturbance, 
coordination about the strategy is achieved to a large extent by interaction 
between pilot and controller, by interaction between controllers at a local facility, 
and by interaction of the aircraft crew (see Figure 2b). To a lesser extent the 
strategy is coordinated by interaction between controllers at different control 
facilities, by interaction at the ANSP organisation, by interaction with others in 
the airline during flight, by interaction within the airline at an organisational 
level, or by other types of interactions. 
 
Figure 2c indicates that to a considerable extent the acquirement of the 
strategies is based on training and experience for both controllers and pilots, 
and to a lesser extent it is based on creativity.  
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5 EFFECTS OF STRATEGIES ON KEY 
PERFORMANCE AREAS 
A qualitative assessment was made of the effects of the strategies for dealing 
with disturbances on the main ATM key performance areas (KPAs), regarding 
safety, capacity, environment and cost-efficiency. Section 5.1 provides a high-
level overview of the KPA effects. Section 5.2 provides results for the KPA effects 
of clusters of strategies employed by controllers and pilots. Section 5.3 provides 
results for the KPA effects of clusters of disturbances. 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF KPA EFFECTS 
For each of the 149 mid-level disturbances, we assessed the effect on each of the 
four KPAs of the pilot and controller strategies for dealing with the disturbance. 
This assessment was done qualitatively on a 5-class scale (Table 5) by judging 
each mid-level disturbance in isolation and by reasoning on the relative effect of 
the strategies on the KPAs.  
 
Table 5. Definition of quality indicators for ATM KPAs 
 Safety Capacity Environment Costs 
Large 
positive (LP) 
Large decrease in 
probability of 
incident/accident  
Large or 
enduring 
increase in 
capacity 
Less emissions 
or noise impact 
for many aircraft  
Less costs for 
many aircraft 
Small positive 
(SP) 
Small decrease in 
probability of 
incident/accident 
Small 
increase in 
capacity for a 
short time  
Less emissions 
or noise impact 
for 1 or a few 
aircraft 
Less costs for 
1 or a few 
aircraft 
Negligible 
(Neg) 
Negligible change 
in probability of 
incident/accident 
Negligible 
change in 
capacity 
Negligible 
impact on 
emissions or 
noise 
Negligible 
impact on 
costs 
Small 
negative (SN) 
Small increase in 
probability of 
incident/accident 
Small 
decrease in 
capacity for a 
short time 
More emissions 
or noise impact 
for 1 or a few 
aircraft 
More costs for 
1 or a few 
aircraft 
Large 
negative (LN) 
Large increase in 
probability of 
incident/accident 
Large or 
enduring 
decrease in 
capacity 
More emissions 
or noise impact 
for many aircraft 
More costs for 
many aircraft 
 
Next we provide some examples of this qualitative assessment; the details of all 
assessments are available in (Stroeve et al., 2013b). 
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• The disturbance “Low visibility” is handled by using low visibility procedures 
by pilots and controllers, implying that pilots may need to taxi at lower 
speeds or use auto-landing systems, and controllers use larger separation 
distances and verify aircraft positions more intensively. Such strategies for 
low visibility conditions are assessed to have a large positive effect on safety, 
as the probability of an accident would increase largely if normal flight and 
ATC procedures would be maintained, to have large negative effects on 
capacity and costs, as airport capacity is reduced considerably and this 
typically leads to delays and associated cost increases, and to have negligible 
effects on environment, as the low visibility procedures do not increase noise 
or fuel burnt. As low visibility conditions may occur regularly (dependent on 
the location of the airport), this is an example of a disturbance with large 
effects and a high likelihood of occurrence. 
• The disturbance “Track problem” refers to situations involving the radar track 
on the screen of a controller, such as track swaps, track drops and false 
plots. These are rare events, which typically occur for a limited time. If a 
controller identifies a radar track problem, the controller may ask pilots to 
report positions, to ask the pilots about potential problems with the radar 
transponder, and potentially to use non-radar procedures with larger 
separations if the situation maintains for a longer period. The strategy is 
assessed to have a small positive effect on safety, as situation awareness 
about the aircraft position is partly retained, to have small negative effects on 
capacity and costs, as the larger separation may lead to some reduction in 
capacity and increase in costs, and to have a negligible effect on 
environment.  
• The disturbance “ATIS problem” refers to incorrect or not up-to-date 
information provided by the Automatic Terminal Information Service, which is 
a continuous broadcast of aeronautical information, such as weather 
information and special conditions at the airport. ATIS data being out-of-date 
is considered to occur regularly. The strategy of pilots is to ask controllers 
for the latest information if they recognize by a time stamp in the ATIS data 
that it is out of date. The strategy of controllers is to arrange an update of 
ATIS data. The strategy’s effect on safety is assessed as small positive, 
especially for approach and landings operations. The effects on capacity, 
environment and costs are assessed as negligible.  
• The disturbance “Allowance to deviate from normal procedure” refers to 
cases where controllers allow pilots to deviate from procedures. This is a 
situation occurring regularly and it was actually not considered a disturbance 
by the pilots and controllers in the workshop. The strategy is to coordinate 
well with pilots and other controllers, such that parties are well informed and 
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the situation is under control. The strategy’s effect on safety is assessed to 
be negligible, as effective coordination between the parties involved can 
ensure that the situation is well under control. The effects on capacity and 
costs are assessed to be small positive, as the deviations from procedures are 
intended to temporarily work around potential problems. The effect on 
environment is assessed as negligible, as the deviations are typically done for 
efficiency reasons. 
 
Figure 3. Effects of strategies of pilots and controllers on the ATM KPAs safety, capacity, 
environment, and costs for dealing with disturbances. For each KPA, effect size (from LN 
to LP), and frequency (from very rare to regular), the fraction of associated mid-level 
disturbances is shown 
 
For each KPA, Figure 3 shows the fraction of mid-level disturbances per 
frequency category of the disturbance and per strategy effect category. For 
safety, the overall result is that the strategies have positive implications in about 
79% of the mid-level disturbances and negligible effects for the remainder of the 
disturbances. Many of the positive safety implications are achieved for 
disturbances that occur occasionally or regularly. The results for the KPAs 
capacity, environment and costs in Figure 3 show that the strategies for dealing 
with disturbances have negligible effects for most disturbances (27-30%). The 
applied strategies may have negative effects on these KPAs for a considerable 
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number of disturbances (64-68%), and only for relatively few disturbances the 
strategies have small positive effects (4-8%). 
5.2 KPA EFFECTS OF STRATEGY CLUSTERS OF CONTROLLERS AND 
PILOTS 
As a way to combine frequency of a mid-level disturbance and the size of the 
effect on a KPA we define the ranking in Table 6. Herein the most frequent 
disturbances with the largest effects on a key performance area rank highest. For 
each of the four key performance areas, rankings can be made with regard to 
positive or negative contributions of the strategies for dealing with the 
disturbances. As an example, Figure 4 shows the safety effects of the high-level 
strategies of air traffic controllers. It follows from this figure that the most 
prominent positive effects are due to the high-level strategies ATC-pilot 
interaction, Configuration management, and Tactical control cycle. Similar 
overviews can be obtained for the other KPAs. 
 
Table 6. Definition of a ranking for the combination of frequency and size of effects of 
strategies on key performance areas 
Ranking Frequency category Effect category 
P1  Regular Large positive 
P2  Regular Small positive 
P3  Occasional Large positive 
P4  Occasional Small positive 
P5  Rare Large positive 
P6  Rare Small positive 
P7  Very rare Large positive 
P8  Very rare Small positive 
Neg Regular / Occasional /  Rare / Very rare Negligible 
N8 Very rare Small negative 
N7 Very rare Large negative 
N6 Rare Small negative 
N5 Rare Large negative 
N4 Occasional Small negative 
N3 Occasional Large negative 
N2 Regular Small negative 
N1 Regular Large negative 
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Figure 4. The safety effects of high-level controller strategies using the effect categories 
of Table 6. (Categories N1 – N8 are not shown, since they are all empty.)  
 
Insights that have been achieved for high-level strategies of air traffic controllers 
on the basis of these types of results include the following. Similar types of 
insights can be achieved for the strategies of pilots. 
• Adapt to context – The strategies of controllers to deal with differences 
between airlines, large workload, and situations lacking procedures have a 
positive or negligible effect on safety. For the other KPAs the effects are 
mostly negligible, but negative effects arise from strategies to deal with 
organisational problems with the ATC workforce, such as strikes, major 
illness, or an insufficient number of controllers.   
• ANSP organisational task – The strategies concerning the ANSP organisation 
such as reporting of problems, safety management and training mostly have 
small or negligible effects on the KPAs.  
• ATC-pilot interaction – The communication actions between controllers and 
pilots, such as providing instructions and information, or requesting 
information are applied a lot to deal with disturbances. These actions have a 
positive effect on safety. For instance, confusion about aircraft identity or the 
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contents of a clearance in the communication is assessed to occur regularly 
and it may have large safety effects. Common strategies in ATC-pilot 
interaction, such as effective use of readback or splitting up complex 
clearances can prevent such types of misunderstandings to progress. The 
effect on the other KPAs is often negligible, but in some contexts (e.g. 
reduced visibility) the information provision may be related to reduction in 
capacity and increase in costs.  
• Configuration management – The strategies to adapt airspace or airport 
configurations in reaction to disturbances (e.g. weather conditions) have 
considerable positive effects on safety, but also may have considerable 
negative effects on capacity, environment and costs.  
• Coordination & information provision – Coordination and information 
provision have considerable positive effects on safety. For instance, a 
controller may provide a wrong message or may not provide a message when 
needed, and another controller (e.g. planning controller) may remind/correct, 
such that further progression of the situation is prevented. The effects of the 
strategies on the other KPAs are often negligible and in some cases negative 
or positive. The largest negative effects are related to information provision 
about bad weather.   
• React to non-nominal situations – The application of contingency and 
emergency procedures is assessed to have mostly positive effects on safety. 
For the other KPAs the effect is mostly negligible or negative, but no more 
than small negative for disturbances occurring occasionally.   
• Tactical control cycle – Controller strategies for planning, monitoring, and 
interventions are at the core of the controller main task and they are applied 
for dealing with a large number of disturbances. The effects on safety are 
positive, up to the level of large positive effects for regularly occurring 
disturbances. The effects on the other KPAs vary depending on the context. 
The largest negative effects are associated with planning for winter 
conditions and applying separation criteria.    
 
5.3 KPA EFFECTS FOR DISTURBANCE CLUSTERS 
To achieve insight into the types of disturbances for which the strategies of 
pilots and controllers have largest implications, the KPA effects of the strategies 
have been associated with disturbances. As an example, Figure 5 shows the 
effects on safety strategies for dealing with the high-level disturbance categories. 
It follows from this figure that the most prominent positive safety implications 
arise from strategies to deal with bad weather situations and traffic relations. 
Similar overviews can be obtained for the other KPAs. 
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Figure 5. The safety effects of pilot and controller strategies for dealing with high-level 
disturbance clusters using the effect categories of Table 6. (Categories N1 – N8 are not 
shown, since they are all empty.)  
 
Based on these results, the following insights have been achieved for selected 
high-level disturbance categories. 
• Aircraft/navigation technical systems – These disturbances do not occur 
frequently or the effect of the strategy is considered negligible, such that the 
KPA rankings are limited. The largest effect is due to the occurrence of false 
or nuisance alerts, which may have a negative effect on environment and 
costs for the flight considered. 
• Controller performance – Disturbances related to controller performance 
typically refer to some kind of error in the performance. The strategies are 
directed to detecting and correcting these errors, e.g. by own detection, via 
interaction with pilots, or via coordination with other controllers. Such 
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detection and correction mechanisms have important positive safety effects 
for regularly occurring disturbances, such as wrong or missing messages.  
• Controller pilot communication – Disturbances affecting the communication 
between pilots and controllers are assessed to occur regularly. Strategies 
towards resolving misunderstandings in the controller pilot communication 
have positive safety effects, which are considered to be most prominent for 
proper understanding of the aircraft identity (e.g. call-sign confusion). 
• Controller working context – The most important mid-level disturbance 
categories are Organisation & workforce (e.g. controller shortage, strikes, 
reorganisation), and Workload (e.g. large workload levels of controller). The 
strategy to reduce capacity may have considerable negative effects on the 
KPAs capacity, environment and cost-efficiency.  
• Pilot performance – There are several mid-level disturbances in this category 
on pilot performance that may occur regularly (e.g. not precisely following 
the ATC clearance) and for which correcting strategies are important for 
flight safety.  
• Pilot situation awareness – Situation awareness problems of pilots with regard 
to crew differences, flight routing and lack of knowledge of local procedures 
are considered to occur regularly and strategies to resolve these kinds of 
disturbances are considered important for flight safety. 
• Pilot working context – Various disturbances in this category, such as fatigue, 
limited safety culture and workload problems, may occur regularly, and 
strategies for dealing with them are mostly focused on improving safety. 
• Rules and procedures - These disturbances mostly do not occur frequently or 
the effect of the strategy is considered negligible, such that the KPA rankings 
are limited. Differences between procedures occur regularly, and the flight-
preparation and pilot-controller communication strategies towards alleviating 
the potential misunderstandings are expected to have a positive effect on 
safety. 
• Traffic relations – The disturbances in this category are at the core of air 
traffic control. The disturbances in the categories Aircraft speed differences, 
and Wake vortex separation occur regularly and the strategies for dealing 
with them have considerable positive effects on safety. The safety-capacity 
trade-off in wake vortex separation implies a negative effect on runway 
capacity. 
• Weather – Weather-related disturbances, such as low visibility, winter 
conditions, strong wind, and thunderstorms are occurring regularly. 
Strategies for dealing with such weather conditions have a focus on flight 
safety and typically imply a considerable capacity reduction and potential 
negative implications for cost-efficiency and environment.   
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6 DISCUSSION 
As a way to understand the human role in the resilience of ATM, we performed a 
qualitative analysis of the strategies of pilots and air traffic controllers in dealing 
with a large set of 459 disturbances that may occur during present-day air traffic 
operations. These disturbances have been identified in considerable number of 
‘pure brainstorming’ sessions for the assessment of the safety of air traffic 
operations. Since the followed brainstorming guidelines prohibit analysis during 
the sessions, a wide diversity of disturbances has been identified, which may 
have effect on various KPAs. The set of disturbances addresses technical systems 
in aircraft and in the ATC system, performance of pilots and controllers, 
communication and coordination in ATM operations, weather, traffic relations, 
etc. Notwithstanding the size and variety of the set of identified disturbances, it 
is recognized that the disturbances are mostly focused on the sharp end of air 
traffic operations with pilots and air traffic controllers working as key operators. 
For a broader perspective on resilience of air traffic, additional disturbances 
affecting other parts of the organisation can be identified and studied, such as 
for airline operations control, maintenance and system engineering at airlines, 
ANSPs and airports, turn-around processes, flow management, and a variety of 
management processes at airlines, ANSPs and airports, including acquisition and 
development, resource management and safety management. In practical 
assessments typically a limited scope is considered, addressing particular 
operations and parts of the overall organisation, and the range of disturbances 
to be considered depends on this scope. The selection of the scope is delicate 
process in which it needs to be considered what sharp and blunt ends of the 
organisation have to be included to address the research questions underlying a 
resilience assessment. In addition to the scoping with regard to the 
organisational structure, the scope should address the range of key performance 
areas to be considered. As part of a resilience assessment, specific disturbances 
may be searched from the perspectives of the KPAs considered (cost-efficiency, 
environment, safety, etc.), such that a broader overall set of disturbances is 
attained. For the set of disturbances used in this paper, it implies that although 
the disturbances identified in the safety-focused brainstorms can be effectively 
analysed for effects on other KPAs, additional disturbances may be identified by 
specific searches from the perspectives of the KPAs. Such searches for 
disturbances may be done by brainstorming, or by studying literature for the 
KPAs and organisations considered. For instance, in addition to brainstorming, 
disturbances for the KPA safety may be gathered using safety assessments, 
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accident/incident reports, accident/incident data reporting taxonomies (e.g. 
ICAO ADREP), or safety culture studies.  
 
Notwithstanding the quest for a large and diverse set of disturbances as a basis 
for analysis of resilience, it should be realized that such a set of disturbances will 
never be complete. There will always be disturbances or particular combinations 
of disturbances that have not been experienced before or that have not been 
imagined in the analysis of a sociotechnical system. This understanding is at the 
core of the resilience engineering research field, which strives to sustaining 
operations under both expected and unexpected conditions, thus including 
disturbances that are not explicitly known in an analysis. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of resilience for a large and diverse set of (known) disturbances implies 
that many strategies for dealing with these disturbances are studied, which may 
also be useful for coping with other yet unknown disturbances. To increase the 
likelihood that strategies for known disturbances can be effective for unknown 
disturbances, the organisation should be able to apply the strategies generically. 
Whereas the work-as-done for a specific disturbance may be described in detail 
(i.e. at a low level of a strategy hierarchy), also the strategy at a higher level 
should be understood by people in the organisation, such that they are able to 
transform them to suitable low-level strategies when they encounter unknown 
disturbances that are similar to disturbances inside their disturbance-strategy 
knowledge base. The disturbances in such knowledge base should be sufficiently 
varied, such that operators are well able to find strategies for new disturbances 
using association with known disturbances. 
 
The analysis in this study used disturbances as a starting point. This makes 
sense in the light of the definition of resilience as the ability of a system to 
adjust to changes and disturbances for sustaining required operations. Although 
the studied disturbances stemmed from safety studies, their purpose in the 
current analysis differs considerably from the application in traditional safety 
analyses. In traditional approaches (Safety-I, (Hollnagel et al., 2013)) disturbances 
are viewed as hazards, failures and errors, and analysis is focused on finding 
requirements that minimize their likelihood of occurrence and their potential 
consequences, e.g., requirements with regard to system dependability or human 
error. In the current study, disturbances are triggering points for description and 
analysis of the work-as-done for dealing with them in the sociotechnical system. 
As the occurrence frequency of the studied disturbances covers a broad range 
from very rare to regular, the assessed strategies of pilots and controllers 
includes everyday actions that are well known and practiced, as well as ways of 
working that are only known in theory and may require some improvisation to 
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actually apply. This focus on a broad repertoire of actions is key within resilience 
engineering for arguing about effects on various KPAs in general and within the 
Safety-II view for arguing about safety implications in particular (Hollnagel et al., 
2013). 
 
As a way for effectively dealing with the large numbers of disturbances and 
strategies, we hierarchically clustered the disturbances and strategies at three 
levels, from low-level descriptions to high-level principles. This hierarchical way 
of clustering follows the clustering for resilience behaviour proposed in resilience 
markers framework of (Furniss et al., 2011), but it was extended to also include 
disturbances. The clustering was applied systematically to large sets of 
disturbances and strategies in ATM. The obtained disturbance and strategy 
clusters are not unique and other clustering techniques may be used to structure 
the disturbances and the approaches for dealing with them. Nevertheless, it was 
shown that it is feasible to effectively cluster large sets of disturbances and 
behaviour repertoires for operations in a complex socio-technical system. 
 
The ways to detect and interpret disturbances and the coordination between 
human operators to attain a suitable strategy for coping with disturbances are 
important characteristics of resilience of a sociotechnical system. The results for 
the disturbances in ATM show that most mid-level disturbances can be detected 
at first instance by pilots (71%) and/or controllers (82%), but that only a minority 
of the disturbances can be detected first via a notification or an alert of a 
technical system (19%). Moreover, the analysis shows that there is always some 
level of coordination between human operators to interpret the disturbance and 
to achieve a strategy, where most coordination is at the level of the controllers at 
local facilities, of the cockpit crew, and between controllers and cockpit crew. 
The acquirement of the strategies is mostly based upon a combination of 
training and experience, indicating that the precise application of a strategy 
typically depends on the specific circumstances and cannot be based on 
standardized actions only. These results provide systematic support for the 
claims in resilience engineering about the key roles of human operators in ATM 
(Eurocontrol, 2009).  
 
This paper provided a systematic approach for assessment of disturbances and 
related strategies using qualitative scales for frequencies and the effects on four 
KPAs in ATM. In particular, each mid-level disturbance was assessed using a 4-
class scale (from very rare to regular) for its frequency and a 5-class scale (large 
negative to large positive) for the effects on a KPA of related strategies. Given 
this coarse scale, the large number of mid-level disturbances and the generality 
  
 
 
 
32 
 
NLR-TP-2015-204 
May 2015   
 
of the assessment, it is clear that the assessment results provide a rather rough 
overview of the frequencies and the implications of the strategies on the various 
KPAs. A more precise characterisation of the effects can be achieved in more 
detailed assessments, which take into account the specific context of the 
disturbances, and the potential interactions between a variety of disturbances. 
 
The results show that the strategies have positive implications for safety in about 
79% of the mid-level disturbances and negligible effects on safety for the 
remainder of the disturbances. This result indicates the safety priority of pilots 
and air traffic controllers when dealing with disturbances. Examples of strategies 
with considerable positive safety implications include communication and 
coordination actions for explanation, verification and correction, monitoring and 
intervention actions in the tactical control cycle, and using different traffic 
configurations depending on weather conditions. These strategies can all be 
recognized as being very normal in ATM and such normal actions are important 
for maintaining safety in day-to-day operations. However, the observed safety 
priority in the strategies does not mean that the performance of pilots and 
controllers cannot have negative safety effects. In half of the disturbances, pilots 
or air traffic controllers may contribute to the existence of the disturbance (e.g. 
misconceptions, errors) and the net effect of human-induced disturbances and 
the mitigating strategies may still be negative for safety. To well assess the 
overall effect on safety, more detailed studies, which take into account the 
context of a specific operation, are needed. 
 
For the other key performance areas (capacity, environment and cost-efficiency) 
the effects of the strategies are negligible in the majority (64% - 69%) of the 
disturbances, but the strategies also have negative implications in a considerable 
number of cases (27% - 30%). Prominent negative implications arise from 
weather-related disturbances (e.g., low visibility, strong winds, winter conditions, 
thunder storms) and from disturbances related to the ANSP organisation and 
workforce (e.g. strikes, controller shortage). Such disturbances typically lead to 
considerable reductions in capacity, increase in delays, additional miles flown per 
flight, and decrease in cost-efficiency. 
 
In conclusion, this paper has shown approaches for systematic structuring of 
large sets of disturbances and strategies for analysis of resilience of a complex 
sociotechnical system. In particular, this structuring has been achieved by 
hierarchical clustering of disturbances and strategies in ATM, by systematic 
characterization of key aspects of the strategies, by classification of effects on 
KPAs, and by combining these effects and disturbances frequency classes. We 
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found that the majority of the disturbances in ATM are quite common and that 
the human roles in detection and interpretation of the disturbances, as well as in 
coordination to achieve a suitable strategy are important. Assessment of the 
implications of the strategies on ATM KPAs has shown that most strategies have 
positive safety effects, which may come at the expense of negative effects on 
other KPAs for a variety of disturbances. These results emphasize the important 
roles of pilots and controllers for dealing resiliently with disturbances in ATM 
and balancing the implications on the operational performance of their actions. 
Design principles for future more automatized ATM should take well into account 
these important human roles.  
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